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Abstract: The guiding principle of sustainability is widely accepted in today´s international 
policies. The principle contains two seperate objectives of justice with regard to the conservation 
and use of ecosystems and their services: (1) global justice between different people of the 
present generation ("intragenerational justice"); and (2) justice between people of different 
generations ("intergenerational justice"). Three hypotheses about the relationship between these 
objectives are logically possible and are, in fact, held in the political and scientific discourse on 
sustainable development: independency, facilitation and rivalry. Applying the method of 
qualitative content analysis we evaluate political documents and the scientific literature on 
sustainable development by systematically revealing the lines of reasoning and determinants 
underlying the different hypotheses. These determinants are the quantity and quality of 
ecosystem services, population development, substitutability of ecosystem services by human-
made goods and services, technological progress, institutions and political restrictions. 
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Do we have to make a hard choice between fighting today´s poverty and preserving the 
environment for future generations? Or are there conditions which enable to foster both 
intragenerational and intergenerational justice? 
1 Introduction 
Global justice between different people of the present generation (intragenerational justice) and 
justice between people of different generations (intergenerational justice) are the great and 
guiding ideas underlying the politics of sustainable development.
1 These ideas of justice are the 
core normative guidelines with regard to the sustainable use and conservation of the services 
provided by ecosystems, such as food and fresh water production, flood protection and erosion 
control. As it could be philosophically justified that people living today and people living in future 
have equal rights to use ecosystems and their services (cf. e.g. Feinberg 1981, Tremmel 2008, 
Visser´t Hooft 2007), the impacts of political institutions and instruments on both 
intragenerational and intergenerational justice have to be considered.  
The political discourse about the relationship between the aim of a juster distribution of 
rights to ecosystem services between countries of the global North and the global South as well 
as within countries and the aim to preserve ecosystems for future generations is blurred. Is a 
globally just distribution of access to ecosystem services a necessary precondition to achieve 
justice with respect to future generations? Or the other way round: Does the satisfaction of the 
elementary needs of the world´s poor inevitably imply the long-term degradation of ecosystems? 
Possible conflicts between intragenerational and intergenerational justice have already 
been noted (e.g. by Adams et al. 2004, Langhelle 2000, Wissenburg 2006), but analysized 
rather specifically, such as for the relationship between conservation of biodiversity and 
eradiction of poverty through protected areas (cf. Adams et al. 2004), and not directly referring to 
                                                 
1 Sustainable development as defined by the Brundtland-Report is "a development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising future generations to meet their own needs“ (WCED 1987: 43).   3
the fundamental objectives of intra- and intergenerational ecological justice. Our study 
investigates the relationship between intragenerational and intergenerational ecological justice in 
a systematic manner, as a clarification of this relationship is of high importance for devising an 
ethically legimate, politically convincing and actually effective sustainability policy. 
Three hypotheses about the relationship between the objectives of intra- and 
intergenerational ecological justice are logically possible: (1) Achieving one objective may not 
have any effect on the chances to also achieve the other one (independency). (2) Achieving one 
objective may make it easier to also achieve the other one (facilitation). (3) Achieving one 
objective may make it more difficult to also achieve the other one (rivalry). We evaluate 
important political documents on sustainable development as well as the scientific literature from 
various disciplines in terms of these hypotheses, applying the method of qualitative content 
analysis (Mayring 2000).  
As a first step of evaluation we assign the core statements and arguments to one of the 
hypotheses, thereby systematically revealing the lines of reasoning supporting each of the three 
hypotheses. In a second step we identify the assumptions which are used to argue in favour of 
each hypothesis. These assumptions concern the following underlying determinants: the 
quantity and quality of ecosystem services, population development, substitutability of 
ecosystem services by human-made goods and services, technological progress, institutions 
and political restrictions. These determinants impact on the relationship between intra- and 
intergenerational ecological justice and therefore influence which hypothesis holds true. The 
higher the intrinsic growth rate of renewable resources, the smaller the population growth rate, 
the greater the substitutability of ecosystem services, the higher the rate of technological 
progress, the stricter the institutional restriction of ecosystem use and the greater the political 
scope for redistribution of environmental property rights the less likely is a conflict between the 
objectives of intragenerational and intergenerational justice. Sustainability policy guided by the   4
objectives of both intra- and intergenerational ecological justice can build on this insight and 
strive to change these determinants accordingly. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss why ecosystem services are a 
core object of intra- and intergenerational justice in sustainability policy. In Section 3, we specify 
our selection of literature and method of text analysis, introduce the three logically possible 
hypotheses, and describe the main arguments given in the literature to support each of these 
hypotheses. In Section 4, the determinants underlying the argumentations are extracted and 
discussed. In section 5, we conclude with consequences for sustainability policy and 
perspectives for sustainability research. 
 
2  Ecosystems and justice 
Humans vitally depend on the Earth´s ecosystems which deliver a large variety of economically, 
socially and culturally valuable services to humans (Costanza et al. 1997b, Sukhdev & Kumar 
2008). A common definition by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) describes 
ecosystem services as “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems“ (MEA 2003: 53). They are 
classified along functional lines in provisioning, regulating, cultural and supporting services. 
Ecosystems provide materials to humans such as food, fiber and freshwater, and create benefits 
by regulating ecosystem processes including climate regulation, air quality maintenance, erosion 
control and pollination. Furthermore people obtain non-material benefits from ecosystems 
through cultural services such as recreation, aesthetic experiences and spiritual enrichment in 
natural or cultivated landscapes. Necessary for the production of the mentioned ecosystem 
services are supporting services: soil formation processes, cycling of nutrients and water, 
primary production and production of atmospheric oxygen. Changes in all types of ecosystem 
services affect human well-being in multiple ways: through impacts on secure and adequate   5
livelihoods, on health, on safe access to natural ressources and security against natural and 
human-made disasters, on good social relations and freedoms available to people. 
Ecosystems are degrading faster than ever (MEA 2005: 26ff.). This is accompanied by the 
loss of important ecosystem services such as climate regulation, flood protection and water 
purification. The harmful effects of diminishing ecosystem services affect especially the poor, 
who have lost access to essential ecosystem services disproportionately with their degradation 
(MEA 2005: 62; Sukhdev & Kumar 2008: 15ff.). The scarcer the availability of ecosystem 
services, the more urgent the question of their just distribution. Especially the human-caused 
global warming has placed the question of intra- and intergenerational justice in the centre of 
political debate: Whereas the industrialized countries in the global North bear the main 
responsibility for human-induced climate warming, the poor people in the countries of the global 
South and future generations are worst affected by its harming impacts. Further important 
societal problems of intra- and intergenerational justice are the rapid and irreversible loss of 
biodiversity (cf. e.g. Adams et al. 2004), the shortage of fresh water and the overfishing of 
oceans. 
The imperative of sustainability regarding the conservation and use of ecosystems and 
their services is widely accepted in today´s international policies (e.g. UN 1992, WCED 1987). 
Intra- and intergenerational justice are, in general, taken as constituent for the guiding principle 
of sustainable development (Kopfmüller et al. 2001, Langhelle 200: 298, Ott & Döring 2004: 58f., 
WCED 1987: 43).
2 This raises the question of how the idea of intra- and intergenerational justice 
can specifically be applied to the use and conservation of ecosystems. In the remainder of this 
section, we elaborate on the specific link between justice and ecosystems, yielding a conception 
that we call ecological justice. 
                                                 
2 The modern concept of sustainable development refers fundamentally to three relationships of the human being: the 
relationship to contemporaries, to future generations and to nature (cf. Becker 2009: 23ff.). In this paper we leave 
aside the dimension of justice towards nature.   6
In his „Nicomachean Ehics”, the Greek philosopher Aristotle (1998: Book 5) makes a 
fruitful distinction between two forms of justice: general justice (iustitia universalis) and particular 
justice (iustitia particularis). Whereas general justice is about the “lawful”, i.e. the basic 
institutions of a just political system, particular justice deals with what is “fair”, i.e. the aversion or 
correction of unjust gains caused by acts of overreaching. Aristotle further divides particular 
justice in the distribution of divisible goods (iustitia distributiva) and the rectification of voluntary 
transactions (iustitia commutativa) and involuntary transactions such as theft and assault (iustitia 
correctiva). This classification can be meaningfully applied to the conservation and use of 
ecosystem services. 
Distributive justice requires that the recipients of justice have common claims to scarce 
goods. Because natural ecosystems are not created by any particular human or any group of 
humans, it seems plausible that ecosystems and their services are the common property of 
humankind and that every present and future person has a legitime claim to use them (Helm and 
Simonis 2001, Schlosberg 2004).
3 A commonly mentioned premise for the application of 
distributive justice is the scarcity of the object of distribution (e.g. Hume 1975: Chapter 3), which 
is certainly given for ecosystem services. Furthermore, distributive justice can be regarded as 
the most comprehensive type of particular justice, as it does not depend on transactions or prior 
caused environmental harm (Leist 2005: 1). Whereas corrective justice is orientated towards 
individually caused environmental harm, the most pressing environmental problems such as 
human-caused climate change and biodiversity loss are caused by a vast number of polluters 
and need to be tackled before the worst consequences will appear. By applying principles of 
distributive justice, collectively caused ecosystem degradation and precautionary ecosystem 
preservation can be addressed. So, there are many good reasons for taking distributive justice 
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as a core principle of ecological justice.
4 In fact, in most contributions to the political and 
scientific literature relevant for this analysis, “justice” is (implicitly) meant to be distributive 
justice.  
The abstract and general idea of “distributive justice” needs to be further specified. 
According to Dobson (1998: Chap. 3) every conception of distributive justice has to specify the 
objects, the community and the basic principle of justice. In our proposed conception of 
ecological justice the objects of justice are ecosystem services. For intragenerational justice this 
basically implies the distribution of rights to enjoy the benefits produced by ecosystems and the 
distribution of duties to conserve ecosystems as well as to pay or compensate for the harms 
caused by ecosystem degradation. Intergenerational justice with regard to ecosystem services 
can only mean sustaining the potential of ecosystems to produce ecosystem services in the 
future (Dobson 1998: 131).
5 Thus, the objects of justice in the intergenerational context are the 
duties to preserve stocks of natural capital, which deliver ecosystem services to future people.  
The  community of justice comprises all recipients of ecological distributive justice. 
Humans` present and local action towards nature affects the provision of ecosystem services at 
the other end of the globe and in the remote future. Thus, the central question is whether the 
community of justice can be extended to the global human community and future generations. 
This question can be affirmed by referring to the moral equality of all people (Feinberg 1981, 
Kant 1949: 59, Rawls 1973: 179, UN General Assembly 1948: Article 1) which implies the 
necessity to guarantee rights to essential ecosystem services. 
The third component for building a conception of ecological justice is the basic principle of 
justice, i.e. the principle of distribution. Rawls` influential “Theory of Justice” (1971) appears as a 
fruitful starting point to derive such a principle. The “Theory of Justice” bears on the distribution 
of basic freedoms and basic goods. Ecosystem services can be subsumed under these 
                                                 
4 The implementation of distributive justice presupposes a stable political system, which is itself based on certain 
principles of justice (i.e. iustitia universalis), such as the protection of the universal human rights. 
5 Sustaining ecosystems and complying to ecological limits can also be viewed as a "precondition for intergenerational 
justice" (Langhelle 2000: 318).   8
categories (Dobson 1998: 125., Visser´t Hooft 2007: 88ff.). Furthermore, Rawls´ original 
position, in which everyone decides on the principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance, 
offers the potential to extend the community of justice to include all people living at present and 
living in future (cf. Beitz 1979, Hayden 2002, Langhelle 2000, Pogge 1989, Tremmel 2008). A 
consequent extension of this original position would produce the following intragenerational (or: 
intergenerational) principles of distribution: (1) Each presently living person (or: each person 
living in the present or the future) has an equal right to use essential and non-substitutable 
ecosystem services. (2) The user rights to all other ecosystem services have to be distributed in 
such a way that they are to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of the present 
generation (or: across the present and all future generations). We interpret benefit, based on the 
"capability"-approach by Sen (1982), as the valued possibilities to live a good life which are set 
by the equipment with rights to ecosystem services. 
Bringing together these three elements, we define ecological justice as an intra- and 
intergenerational distributive justice, which is about distributing rights to ecosystem services and 
duties to conserve stocks of natural capital according to the Rawlsian principles of justice, 
including all present and future people as recipients of justice. Whereas intragenerational 
ecological justice relates to global justice between different people of the present generation 
regarding the distribution of rights to access ecosystem services and of the benefits arising out 
of their utilisation, intergenerational ecological justice relates to justice between people of 
different generations regarding the duties to conserve intact ecosystems for future generations. 
For instance, both objectives of ecological justice are expressed in the UN-Convention on 
Biological Diversity (1992: Article 1) which explicitly aims at both the “conservation of biological 
diversity“, which can be interpreted as the aim of intergenerational ecological justice, and the 
“equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization“, which can be interpreted as the 
aim of intragenerational ecological justice. 
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3  Survey of the literature 
In the political and scientific discourse there is a multitude of views on how the establishment of 
global intragenerational and intergenerational ecological justice relate to each other. Our 
literature survey includes important political documents on sustainable development (WCED 
1987, UN 1992, UN 2002, UN/DESA 1992) as well as the scientific literature from various 
disciplines, encompassing natural resource management, ecosystem ecology, neoclassical and 
ecological economics, political science on environment and development issues, environmental 
ethics as well as interdisciplinary analyses. The selection of literature is based on two criteria: (i) 
a broad covering of all scientific disciplines dealing with ecological justice and (ii) the political 
importance of documents on sustainable development. We considered all aspects of the 
literature concerning the relation between intra- and intergenerational ecological justice. 
In most of the selected political and scientific documents links between poverty and 
environmental degradation are explored in general (cf. UN 2002, WBGU 2004, WCED 1987), 
whereas the hypotheses under study here specifically focus on justice with regard to ecosystem 
services. Therefore, the question arises, whether the extent of poverty can be equated with a 
measure of intragenerational ecological justice, and whether the extent of ecosystem 
degradation can be equated with a measure of intergenerational ecological justice. Certainly, the 
conservation of non-substitutable and vital ecosystem services is generally regarded as a 
necessary precondition for safeguarding the basic rights of future generations. Therefore, we 
view environmental degradation with harmful impacts on future generations as an indicator of 
intergenerational injustice. The report  "World in Transition – Fighting Poverty through 
Environmental Policy" of the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU 2004) shows 
that links exist between a lack of access to ecosystem services and multiple dimensions of 
poverty, encompassing income poverty, disease and malnutrition as well as lack of education 
and social stability. Likewise the MEA-report illustrates how the constituents of human well-being   10
depend on the provision of ecosystem services (MEA 2003: 78) and the TEEB-Report illustrates 
the links between ecosystem services and the Millenium Development Goals (Sukhdev & Kumar 
2008: 21). Nevertheless, a lack of access to ecosystem services is one important cause of 
poverty, but not an equivalent to poverty. Therefore, we try to focus on those parts of the texts 
that directly deal with the access and user rights to ecosystems. 
Three relationships between the objectives of intra- and intergenerational ecological justice 
are logically possible: independency, facilitation and rivalry. The following hypotheses are 
constructed to express these logical relationships: 
•  Independency-hypothesis: The objectives of intragenerational and intergenerationial 
ecological justice can be reached independently, that is achieving one objective does not 
have any effect on the chances to also achieve the other one. 
•  Facilitation-hypothesis: Achieving one objective makes it easier to also achieve the other 
one. This facilitation may be one-way, or the other way, or a mutual facilitation between 
the achievement of the two objectives of intragenerational and intergenerational 
ecological justice. 
•  Rivalry-hypothesis: A fundamental rivalry (trade-off) exists between the objectives of 
intragenerational and intergenerational ecological justice, so that achieving one objective 
makes it more difficult to also achieve the other one. 
To evaluate the selected literature, we apply the method of qualitative content analysis (Mayring 
2000). As a first step of analysis we extract the core statements and arguments found in the 
selected literature about the relationship between intra- and intergenerational ecological justice 
and assign them to the different hypotheses, thereby systematically revealing the lines of 
reasoning supporting each of the three hypotheses (Sections 3.1–3.3). In a second step of 
analysis we identify the assumptions about the fundamental determinants which are used to 
argue in favour of each hypothesis (Section 4).   11
3.1 Independency-hypothesis 
 
The independency-hypothesis states that the objectives of intragenerational and 
intergenerationial ecological justice can be reached independently, that is achieving one 
objective does not have any effect on the chances to also achieve the other one. This 
hypothesis cannot be found explicitly in empirical studies or political documents. However, it is 
an implicit assumption, or a consequence of more fundamental assumptions, made in many 
economic conceptualisations and models.  
In the environmental-and-resource-economics literature, sustainability is commonly 
defined as the maintainence over an infinite time horizon of a further specified measure such as, 
e.g. the total capital stock, the natural capital stock, per capita consumption, welfare, or a vector 
of such measures (Arrow et al. 2004; Atkinson et al. 1997; Costanza et al. 1997a; Hanley et al. 
1997; Perman et al. 2003). Sustainability is thus reduced to its intergenerational dimension. In 
contrast, economic theories and analyses of distributive justice (surveyed e.g. by Roemer 1996) 
solely refer to the present. By this seperation, environmental and resource economics eludes the 
analysis of possible interdependencies between intragenerational and intergenerational justice. 
Contributions to ecological economics regard both objectives of justice as highly important 
and acknowledge that interactions may occur in the implementation of them. Nevertheless, 
ecological economics stresses the conservation of ecosystems for future generations in the 
context of sustainable development. Sustainability is conceptualised with reference to concepts 
such as ecological carrying capacity or ecological resilience
6 (cf. Atkinson et al. 1997: 119ff., 
Costanza et al. 1997a: 3), leading to notions of “strong” sustainability (Pearce et al. 1989, Daly 
and Cobb 1989, Ekins et al. 2003, Ott and Döring 2004). 
Also, some basic models and results of welfare economics support the independency-
hypothesis. They imply that the overall intertemporal impact of human economic action towards 
                                                 
6 Resilience is commonly defined as „the potential of a particular configuration of a system to maintain its 
structure/function in the face of disturbance, and the ability of the system to re-organize following disturbance-driven 
change” (Holling & Wagner 2003).   12
nature is independent of the initial distribution of rights to use ecosystems. For example the 
Coase-Theorem suggests that different allocations of property rights to a formerly open-access 
resource
7 would result in the same overall extent of resource utilisation, if all parts of the 
resource are owned by someone (Coase 1960). A simple model, which allocates tradable 
property rights to the resource completely to either the polluter or to the "pollutee" and in which 
both enter a bargaining process, yields as the result of the bargaining process the same 
equilibrium level of pollution in both cases.
8  
Another result of welfare economics supporting the independency-hypothesis concerns 
cap-and-trade systems for formerly open-access ecosystem services, e.g the atmospheric sink 
function for greenhouse gase emissions. Political targets determine the overall volume of 
greenhouse gases allowed to emit into the atmosphere. For this overall volume tradable 
certificates are created, which can be viewed as property rights on the atmospheric sink function 
for greenhouse gases. Thereby, a market for the emission of greenhouse gases is created. All 
initial allocations of emission certificates would equally ensure the compliance with the set cap of 
greenhouse gases, but would differ in their effects on intragenerational distributive justice. This 
implies that introducing and implementing a cap-and-trade system is of importance to the extent 
of ecosystem utilisation, and thus to intergenerational justice, whereas the initial distribution of 
the user rights within this system does not matter (Perman 2003: 219ff.).
9 An important 
presumption underlying both insights is the existence of a perfect and decentralised private 
ownership market economy without any externalities or transaction costs. 
To sum up, implicitly the independency-hypothesis is underlying many concepts and 
models in the context of sustainability in ecological, environmental and resource economics. 
                                                 
7 Open-access resources are characterised by rivalry in consumption and non-excludability from consumption 
(Perman 2003: 126). 
8 In the equilibrium the marginal cost of pollution equals the marginal benefits of pollution. This equilibrium point is the 
welfare optimal level of pollution (Coase 1960, Gravelle & Rees 2004: 320f.) 
9 This says nothing about up to what extent the welfare-optimal level of ecosystem utilisation can guarantee the 
preservation of intact ecosystems in the long-term and thereby intergenerational justice.   13
3.2 Facilitation-hypothesis 
 
The facilitation-hypothesis states that achieving one of the objectives of intra- and 
intergenerational justice makes it easier to also achieve the other one. It represents a core belief 
of important political documents on sustainable development, for example the Brundtland-Report 
(WCED 1987) and the Report of the United Nations´ World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(UN 2002). The hypothesis points to two possible causal connections between intra- and 
intergenerational justice, specified by variant A and B, respectively. A third variant C is based on 
the simultaneous existence of both causal links. 
3.2.1  Facilitation-hypothesis A: The achievement of intragenerational ecological 
justice facilitates intergenerational ecological justice. 
 
According to facilitation-hypothesis A an increase of justice to future generations is a positive 
side effect of a juster intragenerational distribution of rights to ecosystem services today. The 
literature contains three chains of reasoning resulting in this hypothesis. One chain of reasoning 
focusses on poverty-induced ecosystem degradation and recommends poverty reduction by 
means of human-made sustitutes for ecosystem services, increases in ecological efficiency 
through technological progress, population control or education as a means to achieve greater 
intragenerational justice, which is at the same time to the benefit of future generations. The 
second line of argument states that a redistribution of environmental property rights can be 
established in a way that facilitates the preservation of ecosystems. A third line of reasoning 
says that international agreements on ecosystem preservation to the benefit of future 
generations are facilitated, if the agreements are accepted as "fair" by all negotiating, that is 
contemporary, parties. In the following, the three chains of reasoning are described in detail. 
The first line of argument states that a reduction of extreme poverty without increases in 
overall ecosystem use addresses a major cause of long-term environmental degradation and 
thereby facilitates intergenerational justice. The Brundtland-Report (WCED 1987) identifies   14
poverty as a cause of ecosystem degradation, because "those who are poor and hungry will 
often destroy their immediate environment in order to survive: They will cut down forests; their 
livestock will overgraze grasslands; they will overuse marginal land; and in growing numbers 
they will crowd into congested cities. The cumulative effect of these changes is so far-reaching 
as to make poverty itself a major global scourge" (WCED 1987: 28). Likewise it is pointed out 
that local communities living in extreme poverty are often forced to apply management methods 
with negative long-term impacts on ecosystems (Adams et al. 2004; WBGU 2004: 79). Poverty-
driven environmental stress brought about soil erosion of 20 % of vegetation-covered land in 
countries of the global South (WBGU 2004: 77). Poor rural communities usually possess only 
marginal land and are therefore forced to migrate. This poverty-environment-loop led to 
deforestation and soil erosion in mountain areas in Central America and to desertification in arid 
regions of Africa resulting from overgrazing by livestock (WBGU 2004: 72). The rapid rise in 
population is generally considered as a factor speeding up poverty-driven irreversible 
degradation of ecosystems (e.g. WCED 1987: chapter 1). 
But how can poverty be addressed in a way that, at the same time, reduces pressure on 
ecosystems? The Brundtland-Commission argues that this would be possible through increases 
in ecological efficiency, development of environmentally sound technologies and especially 
technology transfers into the countries of the global South (WCED 1987: 25). Advocates of an 
efficiency revolution consider a four- to tenfold increase of material and energy efficiency 
possible (e.g. Harrison 1992, von Weizäcker et al. 1995). The German Advisory Council on 
Global Change points to technological leapfrogging, i.e. overleaping of resource-consumptive 
stages of development, as a key strategy to reduce poverty without rising ecosystem 
degradation (WBGU 2004: 97ff.) and the Agenda 21 suggests a transfer of environmentally 
sound technology (UN/DESA 1992: chapter 34). According to this line of reasoning 
environmentally sound substitutes for ecosystem services, e.g. the use of solar cookers instead 
of fuel-wood in Africa, and efficiency increases through technological progress und technology   15
transfer, e.g. improved irrigation systems to use fresh water more effciently, are crucial 
measures to address poverty and ecosystem degradation simultaneously. 
Two further strategies are mentioned to reduce poverty in a way that favours ecosystem 
preservation: controlling population development and improving education (e.g. MEA 2005: 92ff., 
UN/DESA 1992: section 4; WBGU 2004: 55ff.). Appropriate training measures would equip poor 
people with knowledge about the links between ecosystem processes and their own livelihood 
and with capabilities to adapt to a changing environment. Thereby, education measures could 
reduce the poors´ vulnerability to changing environmental conditions and lay the foundations for 
adopting and advancing environmentally sound technologies (WBGU 2004: 55f.). 
The second line of argument supporting facilitation-hypothesis A runs as follows: A 
transfer of user rights to ecosystems from the countries of the global North to the countries of the 
global South would create greater intragenerational justice. At the same time it would reduce 
total environmental stress, because sufficient user rights to ecosystems to secure their livelihood 
would allow the poor to afford an environmentally sound management of their local ecosystems.  
Advocates of this argumentation regard the overuse of local ecosystems by the poor to 
survive from day to day as only one side of the coin. The other side would be the massive 
consumption of global natural resources and the overuse of, in many cases global, ecosystem 
services by the industrialised countries (Bartelmus 1994: 11; Visser´t Hooft 2007: 18; Sachs 
2001: 75). The investigation of the causes of human-induced global ecological problems, 
including global warming, fresh water shortage and pollution, soil degradation, loss of biological 
diversity and air pollution, revealed that the negative impacts of poverty on the environment are 
overestimated. Industrialisation and high levels of well-being are a much greater issue (WBGU 
2004: 4). If intragenerational justice was achieved by redistributing user rights to ecosystem 
services between countries of the global North and countries of the global South, this would not 
be to the harm of future generations (Costanza et al. 1997b: 16, Goodland 1992: 40; 10; 
Kopfmüller et al. 2001: 107; Sachs 2001: 2ff.). But does this kind of redistribution really reduce   16
absolute pressure on ecosystems? Would rural communities stop degrade their local 
ecosystems which are the basis of their own present and future income, if their user rights to 
ecosystems are expanded by means of redistribution? The answer to this question depends, 
besides sufficient user rights to ecosystems to secure a livelihood, on many institutions including 
well-functioning credit, product and labour markets, effective monitoring of rules, proper 
enforcement of policies and secure land tenure (Ruijs et al. 2008: 9). 
There is another argument, why the achievement of intragenerational justice can facilitate 
intergenerational justice: Only international agreements on ecosystem conservation, which are 
preceived as beneficial and intragenerational "fair" by all parties, are politically achieveable 
(Sachs 2001: 94ff.). By employing elements of game theory, it could be shown that a win-win-
situation is a precondition for a successful self-enforcing international environmental agreement, 
which facilitates intergenerational ecological justice (e.g. Elsasser 2002). 
3.2.2  Facilitation-hypothesis B: The achievement of intergenerational ecological 
justice facilitates intragenerational ecological justice. 
 
Facilitation-hypothesis  B is logically possible, but there are no arguments supporting this 
hypothesis in the literature. Facilitation-hypothesis  B is included in facilitation-hypothesis  C, 
which states that one cannot argue that intragenerational justice is facilitated by realising 
intergenerational justice without arguing that intergenerational justice is facilitated by realising 
intragenerational justice. Someone who argues in favour of facilitation-hypothesis C thus holds 
that both facilitation-hypotheses A and B are correct. 
3.2.3  Facilitation-hypothesis C: There is a mutual facilitation between the 
achievement of intragenerational and intergenerational ecological justice. 
 
The core content of facilitation-hypothesis C is that many human-made environmental problems, 
threatening the lives and well-being of future generations, vitally affect the access to essential 
ecosystem services of the world´s poor already today (MEA 2003: 71ff.; Tremmel 2008: 63;   17
WCED 1987). It would therefore prove advantageous for today´s poor as well as for future 
generations to tackle these environmental problems. 
Global climate change is a prime example, being a presently acute as well as a long-
ranging global environmental problem. The industrialised countries in the global North are 
largely responsible for human-induced climate change. In contrast, its harmful impacts first of all 
affect poor people in countries of the global South as well as future generations. The poorest are 
worst affected, because their livelihoods directly depend on their natural environment and they 
are in a far worse position to adapt to changing climate conditions and extreme weather events 
(IPPC 2007b). Already today, global warming exacerbates the water crises in Southern Africa 
and Western Sahel, affects food production and food security just as it fosters the spread of 
infectious diseases like malaria (IPPC 2007b.; WBGU 2004: 65ff.). The effects of global warming 
jeopardize and undermine human rights (such as the right to physical integrity) of the poor 
people living today and will further deepen global injustice concerning the access to ecosystem 
services in the decades to come (Neefjes 1999: 253). Slowing down climate change would 
therefore equally help fulfil the rights of future generations to live under stable climate conditions 
and favour intragenerational justice today. 
The situation is very similar for biological diversity. The drastic loss of biological diversity 
carries long-term risks such as the loss of ecosystem resilience as it threatens food, income and 
health security of rural communities in the global South at present, whereas intact ecosystems 
with their great diversity of species and breeds are supermarket, property market and pharmacy 
to poor rural communities (Sukhdev & Kumar 2008: 15ff.). Put positively, the protection of intact 
ecosystems, and the restoration of degraded ones, proves advantageous to the well-being of 
today´s poor people as well as to the well-being of future generations by enhancing the delivery 
of vital ecosystem services now and in the future (WCED 1987: 19ff.; MEA 2003: 3ff., Sukhdev & 
Kumar 2008).   18
3.3 Rivalry-hypothesis 
 
The rivalry-hypothesis states that a fundamental rivalry (trade-off) exists between the objectives 
of intragenerational and intergenerational ecological justice, so that achieving one objective 
makes it more difficult to also achieve the other one. It can also be stated as saying that the 
quantity and quality of existing ecosystem services are insufficient to fulfil both the justified 
claims of present and future people. More intragenerational ecological justice would imply less 
intergenerational justice and vice versa. The creation of protected areas to preserve intact 
ecosystems for future generations often negatively impacts on today´s poverty, as it closes land 
use options to poor rural communities (Adams et al. 2004). Vice versa, it is assumed that the 
vital needs of the poor in the global South, especially for ecosystem services characterized by 
rivalry in use such as food, fuel and freshwater, can only be met at the expense of long-term 
ecological interests (Visser´t Hooft 2007: 84; Roemer 2007: 226). Alleviating poverty by securing 
sufficient access of today’s poor to ecosystem services would, according to this hypothesis, 
cause an increasing overall degradation of ecosystems, thus reducing the availability of 
ecosystem services to future generations.  
This chain of reasoning does not consider an intragenerational redistribution of 
environmental property rights, neither within nations nor between industrialised countries and 
countries of the global South. If fundamental intragenerational redistribution of environmental 
property rights impeded by political restrictions or simply not taken into account (as in WCED 
1987), intragenerational justice can only be achieved by extending the poors´ rights to use 
ecosystems. This would inevitably lead to ongoing environmental degradation to the 
disadvantage of future generations. So, extending the poors´ user rights to ecosystems without 
reducing them elsewhere is inevitably at the cost of future generations. Obviously, this conflict 
intensifies if the countries of the global South claim environmental property rights which do not 
only guarantee subsistence level but also allow for the same opportunities to economic   19
development than were enjoyed by countries with earlier development. It is claimed as highly 
unlikely that ecosystem degradation can be stopped solely through technological progress if 
most of the world´s population is to reach the resource consumption level of today´s 
industrialised countries (Ekins 1993, Wissenburg 2006: 429). Goodland illustrates this dilemma 
as a conflict between two realisms: ”On the one hand political realism rules out income 
redistribution and population stability as politically difficult, if not impossible; therefore the world 
economy has to expand by a factor of five or ten in order to alleviate poverty. On the other hand 
ecological realism accepts that the global economy has already exceeded the sustainable limits 
of the global ecosystem and that a fivefold to tenfold expansion of anything remotely resembling 
the present economy would simply speed us from today´s longrun unsustainability to imminent 
collapse“ (Goodland 1992: xiii). 
Whereas advocates of facilitation-hypothesis A (according to which the achievement of 
intragenerational ecological justice facilitates intergenerational ecological justice) presume a 
stabilisation of population number as well as either an intragenerational redistribution of 
environmental property rights or a decoupling of environmental pressure from economic growth, 
advocates of the rivalry hypothesis challenge exactly these premises (e.g. Dobson 1998: 134; 
Goodland 1992: 42; Sachs 2001: 88). Supporters of the rivalry hypothesis question the 
predominant Western model of development and the associated patterns of production and 
consumption. To reduce the conflict between the objectives of intragenerational and of 
intergenerational justice they point out pathways to resource-conserving prosperity models. 
These give priority to the adaptation of material and energy flows to the regenerative capacity of 
ecosystems and raise the question of "How much is enough/too much?" (Kopfmüller et al. 2001: 
107; Sachs 2001: 197). 
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4  The underlying determinants 
A more fundamental analysis of the arguments used to support the three hypotheses reveals 
that they draw on specific assumptions about underlying determinants. These determinants are 
the quantity and quality of ecosystem services, population development, substitutability of 
ecosystem services by human-made goods and services, technological progress, institutions 
and political restrictions. The analysis of the arguments for each of the three hypotheses shows 
that different assumptions regarding the underlying determinants lead to the verification of 
different hypotheses. Hence, the determinants act upon the relationship between intra- and 
intergenerational ecological justice and thereby influence which hypothesis holds true (cf. Figure 
1). Clarifying the impact of the underlying determinants on the objectives of intra- and 
intergenerational ecological justice is of high importance for sustainability policy, which can strive 
to change these determinants to prevent and solve goal conflicts. 
 
Figure1: Six underlying determinants affect the relationship between the objectives of 
intragenerational and intergenerational ecological justice: the quantity and quality of ecosystem 
services, population development, substitutability of ecosystem services by human-made goods 
and services, technological progress, institutions and political restrictions   21
 
4.1  Quantity and quality of ecosystem services 
The quantity of ecosystem services refers to the amount of ecosystem services produced by 
today´s ecosystems as well as to the intrinsic growth rate of renewable resources, which 
determines the potential amount of delivered provisioning ecosystem services in the future. The 
quantity of ecosystem services determines, inter alia, whether and to what extent there is a 
rivalry between meeting the justified claims on ecosystem services of people living at present 
and meeting such claims of future people. For instance, the rivalry-hypothesis holds true if the 
quantity of ecosystem services is insufficient to realise both intra- and intergenerational 
ecological justice. 
We describe the quality of ecosystem services with reference to two fundamental and 
distinctive characteristics: rivalry/non-rivalry in consumption and excludability/non-excludability 
from use. Rivalry in consumption means that the use of an ecosystem service by one person   22
does diminish another person’s ability to use the same service. An example is the provisioning 
service of food production. One unit of food consumed by one person cannot be consumed by 
another person any more. Many regulating and cultural ecosystem services are characterised by 
non-rivalry in consumption, that is, their use by one person does not diminish another person’s 
ability to use the same service. Examples include climate stabilisation or aesthetic beauty of a 
landscape. Non-excludability from use means that within the current social, legal and economic 
order no one can be excluded from using the service. For example, the services climate 
regulation and flood protection prove advantageous not only to people, who contributed to their 
delivery e.g. through preservation of bogs or reforestation, but also to many other persons 
locally and globally who cannot be excluded from benefiting from these services. Positive 
externalities spring from ecosystem services that are characterised by non-rivalry in use and 
non-excludability from use: The provision of ecosystem services by one person has a direct 
positive impact on the well-being of other persons. 
The basic models and results of welfare economics supporting the independency-
hypothesis presuppose that ecosystem services, characterized by rivalry in consumption and 
non-excludability from consumption, can be made excludable by an institutional arrangement 
such as e.g. privatisation or implementation of a cap-and-trade-system. Facilitation-hypothesis C 
is essentially based on the assumption of positive externalities springing from the preservation or 
restoration of ecosystems to today´s poor and to future generations. Advocates of the rivalry-
hypothesis refer to ecosystem services characterized by rivalry in consumption. The present 
overuse of such services would lead to the depletion of the delivering stocks (e.g. fish 
populations and forests) and the degradation of supporting and regulating services (e.g. the loss 
of erosion control) with harmful consequences for future people.    23
4.2 Population  development 
The determinant population growth refers to the growth rate of human population in total as well 
as to the spatial distribution of demographic development at present and projected into the 
future.
10  
In the context of facilitation-hypothesis A it is assumed that controlling population 
development in countries of the global South is a means to achieve greater intragenerational 
justice, which at the same time reduces poverty-induced ecosystem degradation and thereby 
facilitates intergenerational ecological justice. Reversely, the promotion of intragenerational 
ecological justice can reduce poverty and thereby slow down population growth (Neefjes 1999: 
257, Thompson 1992, WCED 1987: 98), what again takes human pressure from ecosystems. In 
this sense, the WCED argues that almost "any activity that increases well-being and security 
lessens people´s desires to have more children than they and national ecosystems can support" 
(WCED 1987: 98). In contrast, the rivalry-hypothesis presupposes that population cannot be 
controlled at a stable number but grows to a number which does not allow to fulfil the justified 
claims on ecosystem services of all people living at present and living in the future in relation to 
the delivered quantity of ecosystem services. 
Differing assumptions of population control and population growth thus lead – everything 
else being equal
11 – to differing hypothesis about the relationship between intra- and 
intergenerational justice.  
4.3  Substitutability of ecosystem services by human-made goods and services 
A definition of substitutability requires a measure according to which there is no change when an 
ecosystem service is replaced by a human-made good or service. Whereas in environmental-
                                                 
10 The UN-Department of Economic and Social Affairs prognosticates between 7,7 and 10,7 billion people in 2050 
(UN/DESA 2005). For the most part population growth is predicted to occur in poor regions, especially in the biggest 
cities (WBGU 2004: 89). 
11 There is a considerable body of empirical evidence that conflicts with the paradigm – used in both lines of argument 
discussed in this section – that population growth causes poverty and environmental degradation (Attfield 1998).   24
and-resource-economics social welfare or individual utility is commonly used as the measure to 
define substitutability, contributions to ecological economics define substitutability predominantly 
as the availability of functional substitutes for every single individual. In case of many vital 
ecosystem services, such as the provision of clean fresh water, a non-substitutability according 
to both evaluation criteria must be assumed: Neither basic human needs nor the specific 
function of the ecosystem service for human well-being are substitutable. In the following we 
understand substitutability with reference to the functional substituitability of ecosystem services 
by human-made goods and services. 
The more ecosystem services are regarded as substitutable, the less harmful is a present 
overexploitation of ecosystems to the realisation of justice to future generations, as long as the 
present generation suffciently invests in other forms of (physical, social and human) capital. In 
the context of facilitation-hypothesis A one line of argument assumes substitutability: 
Environmentally sound fuctional substitutes for ecosystem services, e.g. the use of solar cookers 
instead of fuel-wood in Africa, are pointed out as a means to achieve greater intragenerational 
justice, which at the same time facilitates intergenerational ecological justice. In contrast, 
advocates of the rivalry-hypothesis primarily relate the quantity and quality of delivered 
ecosystem services to the number of present and future people and thereby implicitly assume a 
limited substitutability of ecosystem services.  
4.4 Technological  progress 
 
We define technological progress as the rate of increase in ecological efficiency, realized by 
innovation of new environmentally sound technologies or by means of technology and 
knowledge transfer of already existing technologies. 
There are specific assumptions about technological progress made in the context of 
facilitation-hypothesis A: Technological progress is mentioned as a strategy to reduce global 
intragenerational injustice in a way that also facilitates the preservation of ecosystems to the   25
benefit of future generations. Advocates of an efficiency revolution consider a four- to tenfold 
increase of material and energy efficiency possible (e.g. Harrison 1992, von Weizäcker et al. 
1995). The Brundtland-Report points out the importance of technological efficiency increases in 
industrialised countries and technology transfer into the global South (WCED 1987: 24ff.). The 
WBGU terms two key strategies to realise intragenerational justice through economic growth of 
the countries in the global South without rising ecosystem degradation: technological 
leapfrogging, that is skipping resource-consumptive stages of development, and 
dematerialisation, that means decoupling the consumption of natural resources from economic 
growth (WBGU 2004: 97ff.). 
In contrast, advocates of the rivalry-hypothesis assume a decoupling of total ecosystem 
pressure from economic growth by means of technological progress to be highly unlikely, 
especially if most of the world´s population is to reach the resource consumption level of today´s 
industrialised countries (Ekins 1993). This would entail a conflict between the objectives of intra- 
and intergenerational justice. In addition, efficiency increases can stimulate further demand and 
thereby raise total consumption of ecosystem services (cf. e.g. Sorrell 2007). 
4.5 Institutions 
Sustainability-relevant institutions are all mechanisms which structure and govern human use of 
ecosystem services at all levels of society (Vatn 2005: 6). They encompass the legal structure, 
formal and informal markets, agencies of government, interpersonal networks as well as rules 
and norms guiding their behavior (Arrow et al. 2004: 149; Vatn 2005: 6ff.). Relevant institutions 
in the context of ecosystem use include private property- or user-rights to ecosystems and the 
rules regulating their distribution, as well as management rules for common goods and sanctions 
securing compliance with them. 
The basic models and results of welfare economics supporting the independency-
hypothesis are grounded on institutional arrangements (e.g. the assignment of property rights or   26
the implementation of cap-and-trade-systems) which exclude non-authorized users from the 
consumption of formerly open-access ecosystem services. Institutions are also of importance in 
the context of facilitation-hypothesis A: Private property- or user rights to local ecosystems for 
the world´s poor are mentioned as a precondition for realising intragenerational ecological 
justice and facilitating intergenerational ecological justice. For example the MEA and WBGU 
recommend the institutionalisation of rights to use ecosystem services, which enable the poor to 
satisfy their basic needs and assure a livelihood, as a mean to reduce poverty-driven ecosystem 
degradation (MEA 2003:81, WBGU 2004:4). Whether securing sufficient user rights to 
ecosystems really stops the poor degradating their local ecosystems further depends on many 
other institutions, including well-functioning credit, product and labour markets, effective 
monitoring of rules, proper enforcement of policies and secure land tenure (Ruijs et al. 2008: 9) 
as well as the empowernment of the local population to participate in decisions concerning their 
local ecosystems (WBGU 2004: 4, Stoll-Kleemann 2005 and WRI 2008: 47ff.). 
4.6 Political  restrictions 
We define political restrictions as the limits to an alteration of political institutions (such as 
agreements or laws) at any level – from the local to the global level. Political restrictions are an 
expression of existing power relations. For example, a redistribution of property rights to private 
land may be impossible due to effective resistance of those parts of society who would loose 
from the redistribution. 
Advocates of facilitation-hypothesis A argue with the underlying assumption that there are 
no or only slight global political restrictions: Both a redistribution of environmental property rights 
and the recognition of the claims of the global South to reach enforceable environmental 
agreements are based on the possibility to fundamentally alter political institutions. On the 
contrary, in the context of the rivalry-hypothesis political restrictions are considered to be tight,   27
and therefore a redistribution of rights to ecosystem services is assumed to be politically difficult, 
if not impossible. 
5 Conclusion 
Our investigation shows that the relationship between intra- and intergenerational ecological 
justice is multifarious and multilayered. Whether the elementary needs for ecosystem services of 
the world´s poor can be satisfied and at the same time intact ecosystems for future generations 
be preserved crucially depends on certain determinants: the quantity and quality of ecosystem 
services, population development, substitutability of ecosystem services by human-made goods 
and services, technological progress, institutions and political restrictions.  
The influence of these determinants can be summarized as follows: The higher the 
intrinsic growth rate of renewable resources, the smaller the population growth rate, the greater 
the substitutability of ecosystem services, the higher the rate of technological progress, the 
stricter the institutional restriction of ecosystem use and the greater the political scope for 
redistribution of environmental property rights the less likely is a conflict between the objectives 
of intragenerational and intergenerational justice. Sustainability policy can build on this insight 
and strive to change these determinants accordingly. 
The literature survey raises two questions for further research. There are different concepts 
of intragenerational and intergenerational ecological justice underlying the discussions in the 
literature. Yet, they are rarely introduced explicitly. Therefore, one question for further research 
is which concepts of ecological justice underly important political documents on sustainable 
development (especially UN 1992 und WCED 1987). The political debate about the ethics of 
sustainable development could be further enriched by a philosophical explication and 
justification of global intragenerational and intergenerational ecological justice. The other 
question concerns the issue of political implementation: How must political institutions and   28
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